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ABSTRACT 
Using 2005 firm level data for 26 countries in eastern and Central Europe, this paper estimates 
performance gaps between male and female-owned businesses, while controlling for location by 
industry and country.  The findings show that female entrepreneurs have a significantly smaller 
scale of operations (as measured by sales revenues) and are less efficient in terms of total factor 
productivity, although the difference is small.  However, women entrepreneurs generate the same 
amount of profit per unit of revenue as men.  Although both male and female entrepreneurs in 
the region are sub-optimally small, women’s returns to scale are significantly larger than men’s, 
implying that women would gain more from increasing their scale.  The authors argue that the 
main reasons for the sub-optimal size of female-owned firms are that they are both capital 
constrained and concentrated in industries with small firms. 
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1. Introduction 
If women face different conditions and institutional constraints than men; these 
factors can spill over into their performance in entrepreneurship. A relatively new strand 
of entrepreneurship research raises the question “Does gender matter?” This paper 
complements the existing research (which is based largely on the experience of one 
country in the developed part of the world), with the analysis of entrepreneurial 
performance by gender in the 26 countries of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), a region where there is little information on this topic.  We measure relative 
performance in terms of sales revenues, profits and total factor productivity and we 
explore economic and institutional explanations for the patterns we observe. In contrast 
to some of the other studies on gender differences in entrepreneurial performance, this 
paper explores many dimensions of performance (such as scale, profitability, technical 
and financial efficiency) and therefore provides a more well rounded and comprehensive 
analysis of the role of gender in firm performance. 
The definition of entrepreneurship in the literature is quite broad, including “self-
employed” individuals (with or without employees), “owners of a firm” and “innovators” 
(defined in various ways).  The operationalization of these definitions is in part 
circumscribed by data availability, but it is clear that they can reflect very different 
phenomena.  In this paper, we define an entrepreneur as an owner/manager of an 
individually or family owned firm. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review the literature on the 
relative performance of male and female-owned firms.  The data are described in Section 
3, and the measures of our performance gaps are presented in Section 4.  We test for 
various explanations for the performance gaps in Section 5 and draw conclusions in 




2. Review of the Literature on the Relative Performance of Male and Female 
Entrepreneurs1 
In this section we briefly review the literature that evaluates the relative 
performance of male and female-owned firms by summarizing what we know about the 
types and sizes of gender gaps in entrepreneurial performance (Section 2.1) and what 
explanations have been offered for the gaps that have been found (Sections 2. 2).  This 
literature spans a wide array of disciplines and journals. Since we focus on firm 
performance, we do not, for example, cover the vast labor economics literature on ‘self-
employment’ as a proxy for entrepreneurship.  Most studies of women business owners 
are in managerial journals; they tend to be descriptive and based on small sample sizes in 
one country (see e.g., Brush, 1992 for a review).  Our analysis is more rigorous, based on 
economic theory of the firm, and uses a large firm-level data set for numerous countries.  
2.1. Measures of Relative Performance 
The evidence on the effect of gender on firm performance is mixed.  Some studies 
provide evidence of female underperformance (e.g., Brush, 1992; Rosa et al., 1996), 
while others do not find gender-based differentials (e.g., Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000; 
Bardasi, 2007).  The findings depend in part on which measure of performance is used 
and what other factors are being controlled for. 
A growing body of evidence consistently shows that female-owned enterprises are 
smaller -- in terms of sales, assets and employment -- than male-owned enterprises 
(Chagnati and Parsuraman, 1996; Coleman, 2007; Robb, 2002; Watson, 2002, Loscocco 
and Robinson, 1991). For example, Coleman (2007) finds that - as recently as 1998 in the 
US - among small firms (fewer than 500 employees), the average male-owned business 
was twice as large as the average female-owned business in terms of total sales and assets 
and had 50% more employees (without holding anything else constant). Similarly, 
Chagnati and Parsuraman (1996) find (using US data) that sales are twice as large in 
male-owned business as in female-owned business. However their sample (less than 400 
firms) was much smaller than Coleman’s sample of 2,800 firms and covered smaller 
firms (4 - 99 employees). While these two studies only provide only ‘unconditional 
                                                 
1 This section was enriched tremendously by the chapter on ‘Female Entrepreneurship’ in the forthcoming 
new edition of Simon Parker’s textbook Economics of Entrepreneurship. We are grateful to him for sharing 
it with us. 
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means,’ Loscocco and Robinson (1991) find sales lower for women among small 
business owners in same industry comparisons (equivalent to the 4-digit ISIC) in the US.  
Their conclusions are drawn from comparing mean sales in industrial sub categories 
dominated by women compared to the sales in categories dominated by men.  There 
findings are reminiscent of the occupational segregation or occupational crowding 
literature (e.g., Meng and Miller, 2001, Preston, 1999). 
Some studies also indicate that firms owned by women are less profitable than 
those owned by men.  Robb and Wolken (2002) study a sample of white-owned small 
businesses in the U.S. and show that women owned businesses generate only 78% of the 
profits generated by male-owned businesses. Bosma et al. (2004) find male Dutch 
business owners outperformed women in terms of profit. Neither of these studies 
conditions on the industrial location of the firm. 
Other studies, however, do not find females perform less well when other 
measures of performance (such as return on equity, total factor productivity, growth of 
sales or employment) are used.  In a study from Australia, Watson (2002) shows that 
women business owners earn similar rates of return on equity and assets as male business 
owners. Using World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2002-2006), Bardasi et al. (2007) find 
that in Africa, female-owned businesses are at least as productive as male entrepreneurs 
when measured by value added per worker and total factor productivity, holding constant 
the industry in which they work.  Similarly, Kepler and Shane (2007) show that there are 
no significant gender differences in terms of performance outcomes of nascent 
entrepreneurs. 
 The research findings with respect to gender differences in the growth of the 
business are mixed.  Some studies show that female-owned enterprises do not under-
perform in terms of employment growth (Fischer et al., 1993; Chagnati and Parsuraman, 
1996) whereas others do (Bosma et al., 2004).  Some find that women-owned firms have 
significantly higher annual sales growth than men (Coleman, 2007). 
2.2 Explanations for Differences in Performance 
 In studies where gender differences in firm performance emerge, various 
explanations for these differences are proposed ranging from psychological and social 
differences between male and female entrepreneurs to institutional constraints.  We focus 
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here on the two which we will address in our analysis – women’s selection into various 
sectors and institutional constraints.  
Gender composition of industries 
One explanation for the lower performance of female entrepreneurs is that they 
are disproportionately concentrated in certain industries, which have characteristics that 
explain their performance (e.g., the less well performing industries or in more 
competitive industries where there are lower profits). Systematic gender differences in 
overall industry composition have been documented in the US and elsewhere. Women 
entrepreneurs are seen to be heavily concentrated in retail sales and services (Bates, 1995; 
Kallegerg and Leicht, 1991; Du Rietz and Herekson, 2000; Loscocco and Robinson, 
1991; Verheul et al., 2004) while industries like construction remain heavily dominated 
by men (Bates, 1995; Loscocco and Robinson, 1991).  Moreover, it has been shown that 
women are less likely than men to operate business in high-technology sectors in the US 
(Loscocco and Robinson, 1991; Anna et al., 1999).  Mayoux (1995) claims that: “Women 
are overwhelmingly clustered in a narrow range of low investment, low profit activities 
for the local market.”  Loscocco and Robinson (1991) show that women are concentrated 
in sectors which tend to have lower sales revenue on average.  Hundley (2001) shows that 
industrial choice explains about 9 to 14 percent of the gender based self-employment 
earnings differential. This was largely due to the concentration of women in personal 
services sector and their under-representation in the more lucrative professional services 
and construction industries.   
Institutional Factors  
Barriers to female entrepreneurship can arise from existing institutional structures, 
both formal and informal. Welter and Smallbone (2003) argue that while formal 
institutions can influence opportunities for entrepreneurship, informal institutions can 
strongly affect perceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities. This is particularly relevant 
in the context of female entrepreneurship. Aidis et al. (2007) catalogue the important 
institutional influences on female entrepreneurship. With regard to formal institutions 
they identify formal gender equality recognized by law, labor market legislation, tax 
legislation and child care infrastructure as being important. In the context of informal 
institutions discrimination against women in the workplace, traditional attitudes, religious 
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beliefs, perception of entrepreneurship as a male activity, social attitudes towards women 
and employment and family values are highlighted as important institutional influences 
on female entrepreneurship.  We focus on institutional factors that may affect access to 
capital. 
First we note that the literature tends to find that women have less access to 
capital. For example, in a study from Australia, Watson (2002) shows that women 
business owners have less start up capital, which explains their lower incomes and profits 
compared to men.  Coleman (2007) found that among small business owners in the US, 
women were less likely to have a loan of any type (46.5% v. 58.9% of the men) and a 
significantly lower percentage had loans from banks (27.3% v. 39.3%). Similarly women 
were significantly less likely to have a line of credit (18.8% v. 32.2%). Finally Carter and 
Rosa (1998) estimated that in Britain, the average female entrepreneur uses a third less 
external finance than the average male entrepreneur.  
Is differential access to finance due to discrimination? Several studies suggest 
that raising capital is more difficult for women than men in the US (Brush, 1992: Carter 
and Cannon, 1992: Carter 2000) and Eastern Europe (Muraveyev et al., 2007), but it is 
not clear whether it is due to discrimination on the part of the banking sector or the result 
of other factors.  
Some studies infer that discrimination by banks can be a factor. An interesting 
study by Fay and Williams (1993) tested for discrimination by sending out identical loan 
applications, whose sole difference was the gender of the hypothetical applicant.  They 
found that the applications were significantly more likely to be declined or restricted if 
the name was that of a woman than a man. In their study using data from Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) from Europe, Muravyev et al. 
(2007) find that female managed firms have a 5.4 percent lower probability of securing a 
bank loan than male managed firms. They also evaluate existence of financial constraints 
by looking at interest rates and find that female managed firms on average pay 0.6 
percent higher interest rates than their male counterparts. Both these factors suggest 
discrimination against female entrepreneurs and the authors suggest that this 
discrimination is found to be higher in the least financially developed countries in the 
region. This is corroborated by Aidis et al. (2007), who - using original survey data from 
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Lithuania and Ukraine - show that access to funds is a more important barrier for female 
business owners than their male counterparts.  In survey data from Ukraine, women were 
more likely than men to cite financial constraints as an important obstacle to running their 
business. These financial constraints also included greater under-capitalization at start up 
and less ability to raise external funds.  
There is some evidence against the discrimination story in the US and Canada. In 
studies with larger sample size than that of Fay and Williams (1993), only modest or 
negligible differences were found in the way that bank loan officers perceived gender in 
business loan applications (Buttner and Rosen, 1989; Wilson et al., 2007).  Similarly, the 
terms of loans grated to male and female business owners did not vary significantly in a 
Canadian national study (Riding and Swift, 1990).  Once one controls for the size and age 
of the venture and the particular industry, gender differences in access to and terms of 
finance (including rates of loan approvals and collateral requirements) tend to disappear 
(Coleman, 2000; Orser et al., 2006). Using data from the Survey of Small Business 
Finances in US, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (1998) find that after controlling for personal 
wealth (in the form of home ownership, home equity, personal net worth etc.), 
differences in denial rates between male and female-owned firms are not statistically 
significant. Similarly, in a study on micro and small enterprises in Trinidad and Tobago, 
Storey (2004) tests for the presence of racial and gender discrimination in bank loans. 
They take the reported refusal to grant loans to groups, when all other indicators of 
credit-worthiness are taken into account, as evidence of discrimination and find neither 
application nor denial rates differ significantly by gender once all other indicators of 
credit-worthiness are taken into account.  
If discrimination does not explain loan decisions, why does the average female 
entrepreneur start business with less capital or have less access to bank finance than 
men? Significant differences in male and female access to finance may be accounted for 
by differences in other characteristics affecting their credit worthiness including human 
capital factors and personal wealth. For instance, women may have on average more 
difficulties in securing a loan than men because they concentrate in the sectors such as 
services, which need less capital (Verheul and Thurik, 2001).  Since banks typically lend 
on the basis of “hard assets” such as plant and equipment, of which service businesses 
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have few, they are less likely to obtain a loan.  Another argument is that they tend to run 
business in sectors with fewer market growth opportunities so it may be optimal for both 
lenders and entrepreneurs (Oser et al., 2006). 
If women entrepreneurs are less growth oriented or run firms at lower capacity, 
this might also explain the lower supply of finance from the bank perspective. Several 
studies using US and UK data have found that women entrepreneurs are more likely than 
men to be working part-time.  This is shown with data on both self-employed individuals 
(Devine, 1999a, 1999b) and firms (Loscocco and Robinson, 1991).  For example, Census 
data collected in 1982 show that while 60% of women owners worked fewer than 29 
hours per week, only 41 % of their male counterparts did so.  Loscocco and Robinson 
(1991) report that only 27% of the women in their sample of small business devoted over 
40 hours per week to business compared to 48% of the men.  
However, is the lower access to loans explained by demand side behavior, such as 
lower applications to banks by women because they are more risk averse or for other 
reasons? Some papers show that women tend to have higher risk aversion (Jianakopolos 
and Bernasek 1998, Barber and Oden 2001, Dohmen et al 2005). These differences could 
have important implications for business performance if higher risk aversion leads 
women to restrict investment in their business ventures. The Global Entrepreneurship 
Report 2005 found that fear of failure is significantly higher for women than men in 
middle income countries (Minniti et al 2005). In addition, Kepler and Shane (2007) claim 
that male nascent entrepreneurs examine more ideas and gather more information while 
pursuing a new start-up than female nascent entrepreneurs.  Do women use less external 
finance and depend more on own reinvesting own profits? There is some evidence to 
suggest that men re-invest a larger share of profits generated back into their business 
(Grasmuck and Espinal, 2000). See also Kim (2006) for US; Carter and Rosa (1998) for 
similar evidence in the UK.   
3. Data 
In this paper we use the 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) data, produced by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This dataset provides detailed firm level data 
for 26 post-socialist economies: 15 from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 11 from 
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the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).2 The original 2005 database is 
comprised of about 9,500 firms, with 200-600 firms per country. The sample was 
constructed by stratified random sampling from a national registry of firms. In each 
country, the sectoral composition of the sample in terms of manufacturing versus services 
was determined by their relative contribution to GDP. Firms that operate in sectors 
subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, 
electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water, were excluded from the sample. 
The sample includes only registered firms (i.e., not informal firms), and their size varies 
from as few as 2 employees to as many as 9,999 employees. Moreover, firms in rural 
areas and small towns are represented since at least 10% of firms in the sample are in a 
small city or the countryside (i.e., population under 50,000 inhabitants). 
The data enable us to identify the gender of the largest shareholder (owner) of 
individually or family owned firms. Hence in this paper we define male v. female 
entrepreneurs as “male v. female sole or principal owner of individual or family owned 
firms.”3  These individuals are also the main managers of the firm. Other strengths of 
these data from our perspective include the fact that the same survey instrument was 
administered in 26 countries in the same year; that there are a host of performance 
variables for each firm; and there are a set of questions dealing with institutional factors, 
especially in the area of finance, which may affect the relative performance of male and 
female-owned business. The weaknesses include a) the small number of firms sampled in 
each country; b) inability to identify the gender of the other owners of the firm when 
there is more than one; c) lack of demographic information on the entrepreneurs; and d) 
the numerous missing answers to some variables of interest (e.g., capital).  
                                                 
2 The 15 CEE countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Former Yugoslavia, FYROM, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia. The 10 CIS countries are: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Note that Turkmenistan never entered the BEEPS sample. 
3 These are existing firms, rather than “nascent” firms.  To the extent that there are gender differences in the 
survival of firms, we may have a biased sample.  However, given Kallebert and Leicht (1991) and Ruderl 
and Preisendorver (1998) have found no significant differences between the survival rates of male- and 
female-owned businesses, our sample should not be biased on this dimension. If survival bias is stronger 
among women, then our results comparing existing firms owned by men v. women might be upwardly 
biased for all women entrepreneurs. 
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There are about 7,000 firms where the largest shareholder is an individual or 
family;4 however, as Table 1 shows, a number of firms are missing observation for the 
performance measures.  Hence, our analytical sample is restricted to approximately 3,334 
firms once we delete observations: a) with missing information on capital (since only 
3,531 firms have information on fixed assets or capital) or sales or labor, and b) from 
two-digit NACE industries with fewer than five firms.  The result is that the analytical 
sample does have somewhat higher mean sales, cost of material inputs and profits than 
the original sample.    
We begin with three basic descriptive statistics of female-owned firms in ECA. 
First the higher concentration of males in business ownership is evident in this region as 
in most of the world.  In 2004, 26.8% of all entrepreneurs were women. This share is 
slightly lower to that found in the global averages, where according to Reynolds et al. 
(2002), men are about twice more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial activity than 
women. However, the average in our data is higher than that found in the 2005 GEM data 
base for “nascent entrepreneurs” in 35 countries. There the rates of female 
entrepreneurship range from about 1-2% in Netherlands and Japan to nearly 20-24% in 
Venezuela and Thailand (Minniti et al., 2005).  The country level shares of female 
entrepreneurs in our data, shown in Figure 1, range from above 40% in Latvia to below 
15% in Armenia. Explanations for the variance in the share of female entrepreneurs 
across countries are left for another paper, which can exploit panel data on countries over 
time.  However, we provide a simple plot in Table A4, which indicates a positive 
association between the level of female education (share with secondary level schooling 
in a country) and the share of female entrepreneurship. 
Second, again as found in other parts of the world, women in this region own 
significantly smaller firms than men, when measured by the number of permanent 
employees.  About 57% of all female-owned enterprises employ fewer than 10 permanent 
employees in contrast with 41% of male-owned enterprises (see Figure 2). This finding is 
addressed in greater detail below. 
                                                 
4 We have therefore excluded from the analysis firms where the largest shareholder is the state, domestic 
and foreign companies, banks, or employees or management.  
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Third, we find that women business owners are more likely to be in certain 
industries than others: about 22% of all female entrepreneurs are found in retail and 
wholesale trade and 14% in textiles and apparel, while only 6% are in construction and 
less than 1% are in extraction activities (mining).  Hence, not surprisingly a large share 
(45%) of the entrepreneurs in textiles and apparel are women, while in mining only 8% of 
the entrepreneurs are women. 
4. Performance Gaps 
In this section we first measure performance gaps in various ways: in terms of 
profits, firm size (total sales), and efficiency (profits controlling for output and TFP).  We 
then perform a robustness test of our TFP measure using propensity score matching 
techniques (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3 we ask whether the scale of operation of male 
and female entrepreneurs is suboptimal. We first present results for all 26 ECA countries 
in our sample (Table 2a) and then present results for European Union (EU) member 
countries and non-member countries (Non-EU) separately (Table 2b). 5 
4.1 Differences in Firm Size and Efficiency 
The unconditional (raw) average profit is 227 Euros in a male-owned firm and 
166 Euro in a female-owned firm in ECA in 2004. Hence, the average female 
entrepreneur earns 61 Euros less (see appendix Table A1).6  When we correct for outliers 
by using robust regression methodology and take into account the country fixed effects, 
the gender gap in profits falls to only 11 Euros but this difference remains statistically 
significant.7 Finally, when we control for both industry and country fixed effects in a 
robust regression, the differences falls from 11 to 7 Euros; it remains statistically 
significant (see first panel in Table 2a). Hence, the inclusion of industry effects is 
important; it reduces the gap to only 3% of average male profits - from 27% for the 
unconditional mean gap. 
                                                 
5 EU countries in the sample include: Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Non-EU countries in the sample include: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, 
Bosnia, Croatia, FYROM, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia. 
6 These gaps in appendix Table A1 are calculated by giving each firm in the sample the same weight.  We 
might consider weighting firms by size of GDP or Population of the country to make them “representative” 
of the region as a whole. In the original sample more firms were included in the larger countries so they are 
roughly representative. 
7 These results do not change when we also control for the age and location (capital city v. other) of the 
firm. 
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Similarly, sales revenue8 of the average female entrepreneur in a given country in 
ECA is significantly (63.1%) smaller than that of the average firm owned by a man 
(using robust regression methods);, once we control for the (two digit) industry in which 
the firm operates, the difference falls dramatically to 37.2% (see second panel in Table 
2a).  Hence, on average sales revenue in a female-owned firm in a given industry and 
country in ECA is less than two-thirds that of a male-owned firm in that industry. 
These findings suggest that women’s firms are smaller in terms of sales revenues 
and profits than men’s firms. Once we control for concentration of female entrepreneurs 
in different industries, the difference in their size and profits falls, but remains significant. 
We return below to the question “What is it about the industries in which women are 
located in that drives down these differentials?”   
In the third panel of Table 2a we next explore gender gaps in efficiency, using 
both a measure of financial efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) We ask whether 
the profit gap we found above could be brought about by a different scale of operation, 
hence we estimate the differences in men’s and women’s profits controlling for sales, 
which can be seen as a measure of financial efficiency.9 We find that by this measure, 
there are no statistically significant differences between male and female entrepreneurs in 
ECA. Hence the originally detected lower profit in female-owned firms is accounted for 
entirely by the lower scale of operation.  
Are female entrepreneurs less productive in terms of the revenue that they 
generate from given inputs than males?  The TFP findings are obtained from estimating a 







ij CIFMLKY εηφδααα ++++++= lnlnlnln         (1) 
where lnY is the log of sales revenues, 11 i and j index firm and industries (at the two-digit 
NACE level), respectively. The inputs include: K, capital stock (at replacement value); L, 
                                                 
8 In the analysis, sales revenue is logged but profits are not logged in order to preserve negative 
observations for profits. 
9 The financial literature often uses the profit rate (profit/sales) as a measure of efficiency.  We also ran this 
regression with the profit rate on the left hand side and a female dummy on the right hand side and find that 
there is no significant gender difference in the profit rate.  We prefer our specification it allows us to see 
that differences in profits by gender are brought about by the scale of operation.  
10 Equation (1) can also be interpreted as a first order approximation for more complicated revenue 
(production) functions.  
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labor (number of permanent employees) and M, intermediate material input (including 
electricity). F is a dummy variable equal to one for a female entrepreneur; I is a set of 
industry fixed effects and C is a set of country fixed effects.   
The estimated δ coefficient on F, presented in the next-to-last column of Table 2a, 
indicates that the average female-owned firm is only slightly (2.1%) less efficient than 
the average male-owned firm in a given industry.12 It is argued that women’s lower TFP 
is driven by lower capacity utilization.  In the last column of Table 2a we estimate 
differences in TFP after adjusting capital for capacity utilization and find that this does 
not change the result. Figure 5 shows the kernel density distributions of the TFP of male 
and female entrepreneurs. Comparing the two we find that they are highly overlapping, 
indicating little difference in total factor productivity by gender of the entrepreneur. 
If differences in the institutional environment of countries matter, it is possible 
that within the ECA region, there are differences between the EU and Non-EU countries 
in the relative performance of male- and female-owned firms. Hence in Table 2b we 
replicate the regressions of Table 2a for each set of countries.  We find similar patterns 
between the two groups of countries for all performance indicators except TFP.  That is, 
for both EU and Non-EU countries gender based gaps exist in log sales and profits and 
diminish once we control for industry fixed effects. There is no evidence of gender 
differences in financial efficiency in either EU or Non-EU countries. However, gender 
based differences in TFP are statistically significant only in Non-EU countries, not in 
their EU counterparts.   
Hence we conclude that on average female-owned firms in the ECA region are 
slightly less efficient in terms of total factor productivity but equally efficient in terms of 
financial efficiency (profits controlling for firm size and industry). The gender difference 
in TFP in the region is being driven by differences in the Non-EU countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Strictly speaking TFP is estimated with output.  However, this is rarely implemented, except in studies of 
a single industry with a homogeneous product (such as cement). Most studies use revenue as we do and 
control for price differences with a price deflator.  Since this not available, we use industry fixed effects to 
control for price (and other) differences across industries.  
12We find that estimating this equation as an industry specific production function (i.e., interacting the 
inputs with two-digit industry dummies) does not affect the coefficient on the female dummy.  With this 
specification, the coefficient is estimated as -0.028, with a standard error of 0.009.   
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4.2 Robustness Check of Differences in Efficiency (TFP) 
The issue of concentration of women entrepreneurs in certain industrial categories 
and smaller firm size, which has received some attention in the literature, is confirmed in 
the ECA region. Moreover, since on average female entrepreneurs constitute merely 27 
percent of all entrepreneurs in this region, one need question whether there might not be 
several industrial categories where males are present but female entrepreneurs are 
entirely absent. In this situation a comparison of male and female entrepreneurial 
performance using traditional regression analysis would compare productivity of male 
entrepreneurs by projecting productivity of female entrepreneurs in industry and size 
categories where they are in negligible numbers or nonexistent. Hence it becomes 
important to ensure that in making firm productivity comparisons we do not consider 
firms in those industry or size categories where the productivity of female entrepreneurs 
is not observed. 
We use propensity score matching (PSM) methods as an alternative specification 
to test the robustness of our regression analysis. Matching methods allow us to weight 
our dataset in a way that the observations we analyze are more comparable. Male and 
female entrepreneurs are matched on industry (disaggregated at the two digit ISIC code 
level) and level of input use (labor, capital and materials). Average treatment effects are 
then calculated for lnSales. This method allows us to compare the sales of male and 
female entrepreneurs that are in similar industries and on similar scales of production, 
thereby allowing us to obtain the average effect of being a female entrepreneur on TFP. 
Propensity scores are calculated by using a logit regression in which dummy for female 
ownership is used as the dependent variable and log of inputs (labor, capital and 
material), industry and country dummies are used as independent variable.  
A necessary condition for the implementation of PSM methods is a sufficiently 
large overlap in the distribution of observable characteristics between control (male 
entrepreneurs) and treatment groups (female entrepreneurs). This condition is known as 
‘the common support condition’. On controlling for industry and inputs we obtain a large 
common support area. Only two observations from the treatment group are dropped due 
to lack of similar control group observations. For comparison we have 2332 observations 
for our control group of male entrepreneurs and 858 observations for the treatment group 
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of female entrepreneurs. To obtain average effects of being female we implement 
‘Nearest Neighbor Matching,’ both with and without replacement.  
The results from the PSM method, presented in Table 3, indicate that if we use the 
stricter method of “matching with replacement,” we find there is significant difference (at 
the 5% level) of 0.15 between the mean lnTFP of males and females. In percentage terms 
the gap is -2.7%, which is quite similar to the significant gap estimated in the regression 
of -2.5% (in Table 2).  If we use the less stringent method of “matching without 
replacement,” the gender gap in TFP (of -4.1%) is significant at the 5% confidence level 
and larger than the gap estimated using the regression technique. Since the findings with 
the regression method are close to those using the more stringent PSM estimate, we 
conclude that they are robust.  Although the difference in TFP is statistically significant, 
it does not appear to be large in terms of its economic significance.  
The next question is whether the differences in TFP are related to the differences 
in scale.  In particular, since women’s firms are smaller than men’s, are they inefficiently 
small?   
4.3 Are Women’s Firms Operating at a Suboptimal Scale? 
In order to determine the extent to which the scale of operation of male and 
female-owned firms are different and suboptimal, we test for returns to scale in the 
framework of the production function. We estimate equation (1) separately for men and 
women using a robust variance method and clustering the standard errors by two-digit 
industry.  We perform two-tailed Wald tests to learn if men’s returns to scale are constant 
(i.e., Ho: αk + αl + αm = 1) and, similarly, if women’s returns to scale are constant (Ho: 
βk + βl + βm = 1).  We then test for increasing returns to scale, using a one-tailed Wald 
test.  We reject the hypotheses of constant returns to scale and cannot reject the 
hypothesis that men’s and women’s returns to scale are increasing (1.024 for men and 
1.049 for women).  We then compare the set of coefficients for men and women and find 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that women’s returns to scale are higher than those of 
men (see Table 4a and 4b).  
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We also explore differences in returns to scale by industry type, where industries 
are classified as being in manufacturing or services.13  On performing Wald tests similar 
to the ones described above, we find that returns to scale are greater than one for male 
and female entrepreneurs in both manufacturing and service industries and the returns to 
scale for female entrepreneurs are higher than those for male entrepreneurs within 
manufacturing and within service industries (see Table A1). 
Hence, we conclude that both male and female entrepreneurs are operating at an 
inefficiently small scale (in the zone of increasing returns), and that women’s firms do so 
to a greater extent than men’s. We note, however, that the difference from constant 
returns is quite small as is the difference between men and women. 
These differences in returns to scale persist when we decompose our sample by 
EU membership (Table 4b). Returns to scale are greater than one for both men and 
women in EU and Non-EU countries. It is interesting to note that returns to scale are 
slightly higher for both men and women in EU countries compared to their Non-EU 
counterparts. These results might reflect structural differences in the business 
environment among these countries and merit further investigation. In both the samples 
we find that returns to scale for female entrepreneurs are significantly higher than male 
entrepreneurs. 
5. What Explains Why Women Are Operating Smaller Businesses?  
We have found that women are operating smaller businesses than men and they 
are somewhat less efficient both in terms of total factor productivity and in terms of 
optimal size.  We noted that holding industry constant reduces the gap in size and hence 
ask “What is it about the characteristics of the industry that women are located in that 
explains these gaps?”  However, since a gap remains even within each industry, we also 




                                                 
13 Manufacturing industries include extraction, food & tobacco, textiles & apparel, wood & paper products, 
chemicals, basic metals, construction and other manufacturing. Service industries include wholesale & 
retail trade, maintenance & repair, hotels & restaurants, transport, post & communications, financial 
services, renting, health, education, recreation and other services. 
 17
5.1 Are Women in “Poorly Performing” Industries? 
The literature hypothesizes and finds some evidence that the poorer performance 
of female-owned businesses can be attributed to the fact that they are “crowded” in “poor 
performing” industries. We noted above the study by Mayoux (1995) which claims that 
“Women are overwhelmingly clustered in a narrow range of low investment, low profit 
activities for the local market” and the paper by Loscocco and Robinson (1991) which 
shows that in US women are concentrated in sectors which tend to have lower sales 
revenue on average. If women are concentrated in industries that inherently use less 
capital, or only serve the local market or are more competitive, this might explain why 
they are smaller. This could also potentially explain why they are relatively less efficient 
(in terms of TFP) than men.  
We explore these questions by plotting four average characteristics of an industry 
(at the two-digit level) against the share of women in that industry, and fitting a 
regression line to the scatter plot.   Although the results in Figure 4 tend to show negative 
correlations between all these characteristics and the share of women in an industry, these 
correlations are not significant in three out of the four plots.  I.e. there is no evidence that 
women tend to be in industries that are less capital intensive (proxied by capital-labor 
ratios) or more competitive (proxied by the cost-price markup) or have a lower output per 
worker. However it does appear from the fourth plot in Figure 4 that women 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be concentrated in industries where the average firm’s 
sales are smaller.  Hence the fact that women entrepreneurs have smaller firms is in part 
explained by the product or service they produce (i.e., industry they are located in).   
In addition to asking whether women are concentrated in capital or labor intensive 
activities, it is interesting to know whether women perform as well as men in industries 
that are capital or labor intensive. To answer this question, we augment the production 
function in equation (1) with variables for the average level of capital and labor in an 
industry and interact these two variables with the dummy for female ownership.  The 
results, shown in Table 5, indicate that on average total factor productivity is lower for 
men who are located in industries with more capital (holding labor constant) but it is even 
lower for women in these industries.  On the other hand, there is no difference in total 
factor productivity of men and women in more labor intensive industries.  
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Finally we ask, to what extent is the variation in sales of male and female-owned 
businesses attributable to between industry gaps v. within industry gaps.  To address this 
question we use one-way analysis of variance methods. The results, shown in Table 9, 
indicate that while the variation in sales revenue of male entrepreneurs is highly 
concentrated within industries (91% of total variation comes from within industry); for 
female entrepreneurs this variation comes both from within industry gaps (74%) and also 
from between industry gaps (26%). This suggests that choice of industry has a relatively 
bigger role in explaining firm size/sales for female entrepreneurs than their male 
counterparts. 
The findings that women i) fare worse in more capital intensive industries,  ii) are 
concentrated in industries with lower average firm sales and iii) are operating at a 
suboptimal scale lead us to ask  whether female-owned firms are being constrained to be 
small by lack of access to capital. 
5.2 Are Women’s Firms Constrained to Be Small? 
Although economically the increasing returns found in Table 4a and 4b are not 
large, they suggest that over time we should observe the scale of firms increasing in the 
economies of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, if women’s firms are currently 
more constrained to be inefficiently small than firms owned by men, removing these 
constraints will result in greater growth of female-owned firms than male-owned firms. 
In this section we ask to what extent male and female business owners are constrained 
from reaching their optimal scale by lack of access to capital.  We first ask whether or not 
women are more constrained than men in access to capital and we then test for the 
relative gender effects of capital constraints on their scale of operation and productive 
efficiency.  
Since another paper answers the first question with the same BEEPS data, we rely 
on the results of this study. Muravyev, Schafer and Talavera (2007) have shown that 
women are (5.4%) less likely than men to get a loan, when correcting for selection on 
whether the firm needs a loan, and controlling for the profit of the firm, capacity 
utilization, age, and competition faced by the firm, as well as industry and country fixed 
effects. They note the importance of controlling for capacity utilization and age; if 
women are operating firms that are younger and at lower capacity utilization than men 
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and this could influence the financial decisions of bankers.  They also show evidence that 
women are charged 0.6% higher interest rates than men. They conclude that this evidence 
suggests gender discrimination against female entrepreneurs by financial institutions; 
which would indicate that women are more capital constrained than men.  
To test for the effects of capital constraints on the scale and efficiency of 
operation, we use four variables. The first variable, Bank Finance is a dummy variable = 
1, if the firm has financed part of their working or investment capital from a bank in the 
past year. The second constraint variable is a subjective measure that assesses whether 
“access to financing is an obstacle to the operation and growth of the business.” We code 
Access to Finance as a dummy variable = 1 if it is considered an obstacle and 0 
otherwise.  The third variable we use divides firms into those “which need a loan but did 
not get one or did not apply for one because they felt interest rates were too high, etc.” 
(Need Loan = 1; 0 otherwise); those which “did not need a loan and did not apply for 
one” (Did not Need Loan = 1; 0 otherwise) and firms that received a loan from the bank 
(Received Loan = 1; 0 otherwise). The fourth variable is simply the interest rate on the 
loans (proxying the cost of capital) which is only observed for the sub-sample that 
obtained a loan.  
As seen in appendix Table A2, the means of these variables indicate that on 
average men and women are equally (and very) likely to view access to finance as a 
constraint.  Women are significantly less likely to receive a loan (37 % v.  43% of men) 
and significantly more likely to not get one if they need it (25% v. 19% for men) although 
equally likely to say they do not need a loan (about 25%).  Women and men are equally 
likely to receive financing from a bank for working or investment capital (about half do).  
On average, there is no difference in the interest rate that male and female entrepreneurs 
pay; on the other hand, average value of collateral for male entrepreneurs is significantly 
lower than that of female entrepreneurs. Muravyev, Schafer and Talavera (2007) show 
that once controls are introduced, there is a significant difference in the interest rate paid 
by men v. women. 
Firms rely on sources other than banks for funding. Appendix Table A3 indicates 
that internal funds/retained earnings accounts for the largest share of financing of 
working capital (67.8% for men and 71.7% for women) and investment (64.3% v. 68.5%) 
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and that women tend to rely on this source more than men.  Borrowing from banks is the 
second largest source of financing for both men and women however it accounts for a 
higher share for men: i.e., 12.6% of working capital and 17.1% of investment capital for 
men v. 8.9% and 12.7% respectively for women. Reliance on equity financing does not 
differ by gender and is relatively small, which is not surprising given the lack of 
development of stock markets in these countries as of 2004. Borrowing from informal 
sources (e.g., family, friends and money lenders) is not very substantive and it does not 
appear to be larger for women than men. Trade credit from suppliers or customers is of 
course more important for working capital (especially for women) while leasing 
arrangements are more important for new investment (especially for men).  Hence 
internal financing and bank financing appear to be the two most important sources of 
financing; it also appears that women rely more on the internal financing and less on 
banks compared to men, which is consistent with the literature (e.g., Coleman, 2007; 
Carter and Rosa, 1998).  
To test whether business owners with less access to capital have a smaller scale of 
operation, we regress sequentially the three measures of capital constraints, as well as the 
cost of capital (the interest rate), on log sales of the firm; we also ask whether these 
factors affect men and women in the same way by interacting the female-owned dummy 
with each of these variables.  To avoid the problem of reverse causality, given that firms 
with larger sales might be more likely to obtain financing from banks, we control for 
lagged sales (sales in 2002) in these regressions. The results from the regressions 
presented in Table 6a generally show that, after controlling for sales three years earlier, 
firms with better access to capital in the previous year generate somewhat higher sales 
revenue. There is no significant difference between men and women in the effect of 
capital constraint on sales.  Specifically, both female and male-owned firms that received 
at least part of their working or investment capital from a bank in the past year (Bank 
Finance) have 1.5 % higher sales than those who do not receive financing from a bank 
(column 2) and similarly firms that received a loan from the bank (Received Loan) have 
sales that are 1.7% higher than unconstrained firms, which did not need a loan and did 
not apply for one (column 3). On the other hand, while male-owned firms that complain 
more about access to finance being a constraint to business operation do not fare 
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significantly worse than firms that do not complain, the opposite is true for women: 
women-owned firms who complain about being capital constrained have larger sales 
revenue than firms that do not complain. This result is harder to interpret given that we 
do not have much information on how subjective perceptions regarding access to finance 
are formed. Finally, the results for the cost of capital indicate that firms which pay a 
higher interest rate generate similar sales revenue as firms which pay a lower interest 
rate, whether owned by a man or a woman (column 4). However, the rate of interest can 
be affected by the level of collateral a firm puts up. In column 5 we show that even when 
the value of collateral is held constant the results discussed above persist. 
Table 6b presents results for the access-to-capital regressions estimated separately 
by EU and Non-EU membership. Most importantly, we find that bank finance has a 
significantly positive impact on firm sales in EU countries but not in Non-EU countries 
with both of our measures (columns 1, 2 and 5, 6). Further, according to one measure 
female entrepreneurs who have access to bank finance perform better than their male 
counterparts in Non-EU countries but not as well as their male counterparts in EU 
countries. However, this result is not robust with the second measure (have a loan), which 
shows no significant difference between male and female entrepreneurs. These results 
suggest that the environment surrounding access to bank finance may differ in these two 
groups of countries and this has a discernable impact on the way this finance affects firm 
performance. The reasons behind these differences need to be explored and could have 
important policy implications for the ECA region. 
To what extent is productive efficiency (TFP) of male and female entrepreneurs 
affected by capital constraints? We find that entrepreneurs that have bank financing have 
significantly higher TFP; there is no difference between male and female entrepreneurs. 
However, the other capital constraint variables do not show any significant effect on TFP, 
although the signs seem to move in the expected direction. Nor does TFP vary with the 
cost of loans (see Table 7). 
Next we ask whether together with the smaller scale, female entrepreneurs use the 
same or different capital intensity in production as male entrepreneurs. The small scale 
may be brought about by K constraints.  We ask here:  Do male and female entrepreneurs 
use different K:L ratios, and, if so, is the use of K and L affected by constraints and/or 
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input prices they face?  We regress ln(K/L) at the firm level on the female-owned 
dummy, the lnSales of the firm, and then add the capital constraint and cost variables 
sequentially. The estimated coefficients on the female-owned dummy in Table 8 suggest 
that the average capital labor ratios of male and female entrepreneurs do not differ 
significantly, within an industry and country (column 1) or when the size of firm is held 
constant (column 2). The capital-labor ratios fall with an increase in sales revenues and 
this relationship does not differ for men and women (column 2). This suggests that the 
firms do not have homothetic production technology or that the relative price of capital to 
the price of labor rises with the scale of operation (sales).  Next we find that firms with 
access to bank financing, and which have received a loan, tend to use more capital per 
unit of labor; this relationship does not differ by gender. The coefficient on the interest 
rate is negative but not significant for men and positive and not significant for women.  
Taking the results in the table together, it appears that the K:L ratio is more sensitive to 
access to capital than to its price. 
6. Conclusions 
Using firm level data from the 2005 BEEP Survey of 26 countries in the Eastern 
European and Central Asian (ECA) region, we explore various questions regarding 
differences in firm performance of male and female entrepreneurs and test various 
hypotheses offered to explain the observed patterns. 
Our first finding is that there is a significant gender gap in the scale of operations, 
as measured by sales revenues.  This finding is consistent with the literature from 
individual country studies which show that female business owners (entrepreneurs) run 
smaller businesses (measured in various ways, including sales and number of 
employees). Our finding holds even when controlling for the industry in which the firm 
operates, although the gap falls from being 63% (when controlling for country fixed 
effects) to 37% (when controlling for both country and industry fixed effects).   
However, counter to studies which have found large gender gaps in profits (Robb 
and Wolken, 2002 for the US and Bosma et al., 2004 for Holland), we find that the 
unconditional average gender gap in profits in the ECA region is small to begin with and 
falls to 3% of men’s profits after controlling for country and industry.  Moreover, we find 
that the gap vanishes when we control for the scale of the firm (sales) in addition to 
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country and industry. Hence women entrepreneurs generate the same amount of profit per 
unit of revenue as men in ECA. 
We provide robust evidence (using two specifications of the production function 
and applying propensity score matching techniques) that the performance of female-
owned firms in terms of total factor productivity is significantly smaller than that of men 
in the same two-digit level industry. We note, however, that the average gap, at -2.1%, is 
small and may not be economically significant.  We also note that since we are using 
sales revenue rather than output as the dependent variable, the lower TFP of women may 
be brought about by women facing lower prices than men in the same industries either 
because of quality or because of comparatively less expenditure on advertising.14   
On examining returns to scale we find that both men and women are operating in 
the zone of increasing returns to scale and are therefore inefficiently small.  However, we 
find that women’s returns to scale are significantly larger than men’s implying that they 
would gain more in profits for increasing their scale. It must be stressed, however, that 
neither women nor men are very far from constant returns to scale, even in the service 
industries where women’s returns to scale is highest (1.084). 
We then ask why it is that women are operating at an inefficiently small scale. On 
this question we explore two alternate hypotheses: a) women’s firms are small because 
they are concentrated in industries which have small firms (low sales), or high 
competition or low capital intensity; b) women are inefficiently small because they are 
capital constrained. With respect to a), we find evidence that the share of women in an 
industry is negatively correlated with the industry’s average sales per firm but no 
evidence of a higher concentration of women in industries with lower K:L ratios or 
higher levels of competition. Hence, women do seem to locate in industries with smaller 
firms.   
We also test whether the lower total factor productivity of women is due in part to 
the industry characteristics. We find that women do indeed fare worse than men in capital 
intensive industries, whereas they are equally efficient in labor intensive industries.  
These two findings lead us to explore further the second explanation (that they are capital 
constrained) for why women’s businesses are small.   
                                                 
14 Indeed we see that women are on average spending a lower share of their sales revenue on advertising. 
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We find fairly convincing evidence from the Muravyev, Schafer and Talavera 
(2007) that women in this region (and data set) are less likely than men to get financing 
from a bank, and they pay higher interests rates when they do. We also find that women 
who need a loan are less likely to get a loan than men who need a loan. Our analysis also 
shows that firms that do have access to capital are larger in scale. Hence, we conclude 
that women in ECA are capital constrained.   
To what extent does the capital constraint affect their scale of operations? We 
show that female firms that are constrained in terms of capital are operating at higher 
returns to scale than female firms that are unconstrained in terms of capital.  Hence, if the 
capital constraint were lifted they should grow to a more profitable scale.  We also find 
that even though they are capital constrained, women tend to use capital and labor in the 
same proportions (similar K/L) as men.  Hence, we surmise that in response to the 
constraint on capital, women adjust their scale rather than their factor proportions. 
Similarly, we found very little effect of access to finance on total factor productivity of 
either male or female-owned firms.  We conclude that access to capital can partially 
explain the smaller scale but does not seem to affect the efficiency.  Firms are adjusting 
their input to reflect the constraint, which perhaps could be attributed to their managerial 
skills, technological differences, regulatory environment (e.g., flexibility of labor market 
enables them to lay off workers easily), which would be useful areas to research in the 
future. 
A separate exploratory analysis of firms in the EU and Non-EU member countries 
indicates that the patterns found for the entire ECA are similar in some respects and not 
others.  Whereas the overall finding of gender differences in scale and profits is the same, 
we find that the gender gap in TFP is significant only in the Non-EU countries and not in 
the EU countries.  We do find that women and men are operating at inefficiently small 
scale in both sets of countries but there is some evidence that women in Non-EU 
countries fare better than men with access to finance.    
There is a stream in the literature that argues that women choose to run smaller 
businesses because they have limited time outside of home production (see e.g., Dolton 
and Makepeace, 1986). However, we find women do increase their scale if given more 
access to capital and they do so at the same rate as men in the ECA region as a whole. 
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We also find that significant gender gaps exist only in scale of firm operation and not as 
some others have argued in firm profitability or efficiency. This further supports the 
argument that on lifting existing capital constraints they are likely to expand at least as 
much as their male counterparts.  
This paper strongly indicates that further research is needed to explain differences 
in firm performance between EU and Non-EU countries. Also, there is evidence to 
suggest that policy in ECA needs to be geared towards easing capital constraints for 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales 5106 1342.0 4767.1 2.0 82480.0
Fixed Assets (Capital) 3531 643.9 2592.8 1.0 49834.0
Permanent Labor 7035 44.3 114.4 2.0 1700.0
Cost of Material Inputs 4816 647.1 2594.6 1.0 59231.0
Output per worker 5106 32.8 38.8 0.0 615.4
Capital per worker 3531 21.7 54.7 0.0 1522.0
Profits 4983 177.9 628.6 -669.0 11852.0
% with financing from bank 7,036 50.9
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales 3334 1602.2 5162.8 7.0 82308.0
Fixed Assets (Capital) 3508 619.8 2505.8 1.0 49834.0
Permanent Labor 3508 45.9 113.0 2.0 1600.0
Cost of Material Inputs 3213 805.8 2936.9 1.0 59231.0
Output per worker 3334 38.8 41.2 0.0 416.5
Capital per worker 3508 21.7 54.8 0.0 1522.0
Profits 3289 211.1 682.7 -669.0 10604.0
% with financing from bank 3508 52.1
* Full sample does not include outliers in capital, labor, sales and profits
** Analytical Sample - observations which have information on capital or are not 
from industries with less than five observations
Table 1: Means of Sample
Full Sample*
Analytical Sample**
Table 2a: Performance Gaps - All countries
Depen. Var.: Profits Profits ln Sales ln Sales Profits ln Sales ln Sales
female-owned -11.424*** -7.193*** -0.631*** -0.372*** 0.834 -0.021** -0.020**
(2.036) (2.090) (0.061) (0.060) (1.281) (0.009) (0.009)










Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus. FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3287 3287 3332 3332 3287 3203 3168
R-squared 0.06 0.51 0.13 0.24 0.76 0.98 0.98
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ln(K adj by capacity 
utilization)
Table 2b: Performance Gaps - EU and Non-EU countries
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
Profits Profits Profits Profits ln Sales ln Sales ln Sales ln Sales Profits Profits ln Sales ln Sales ln Sales ln Sales
female-owned -8.433*** -13.462*** -4.538 -9.949*** -0.633*** -0.631*** -0.374*** -0.392*** 2.336 -0.575 -0.037** -0.015 -0.035** -0.015
(2.987) (2.772) (3.006) (2.958) (0.098) (0.079) (0.093) (0.079) (1.938) (1.783) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
lnY 32.193*** 35.487*** 0.207*** 0.209***
(0.552) (0.536) (0.010) (0.008)
lnL 0.204*** 0.209***
(0.010) (0.008)
lnK 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.793*** 0.794***





Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1479 1808 1479 1808 1488 1844 1488 1844 1479 1808 1431 1772 1419 1749
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.63 0.15 0.11 0.28 0.23 0.75 0.83 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ln(capital adj by 
capacity utilization)
Variable: Sample Female Mean Male Mean Diff. S.E. % Diff. Regression
TFP Unmatched 5.45 6.01 -0.56 0.06
With Replacement
TFP ATT 5.45 5.60 -0.15** 0.45 -0.027
Without Replacement -0.025
TFP ATT 5.45 5.69 -0.24** 0.07 -0.041
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors presented.




Note: Common support identical for matching with and without replacement
Treated (Female)
Total
Table 3: Comparing Mean TFP Estimates for Male and Female Entrepreneurs from Regression 
with those from Propensity Score Matching 
Treatment assignment
Untreated (Male)
Table 4a: Returns to Scale - All countries
Depen. Var.: Ln Sales    Male 











Standard errors clustered by industry and shown in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression with country and industry fixed effects
Wald Test - Male and Female Entrepreneurs
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
p value for left tailed test
F(num,den)
Conclusion Null Hypothesis Rejected
Male and Female returns to scale not the same
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale
for females greater than that for males
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale are
greater than one  
F(1,32) F(1,30)
αl + αk + αm = 1 βl + βk + βm = 1
βl + βk + βm <1
Null Hypothesis is Rejected
0.000057





αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm
Men Women Men = or > Women
Table 4b: Returns to Scale - EU vs. Non-EU
EU=0 Non-EU Non-EU EU EU
Male Female Male Female
lnLL 0.255*** 0.351*** 0.326*** 0.300***
(0.031) (0.087) (0.055) (0.060)
lnKK 0.037*** -0.004 0.036*** 0.021
(0.010) (0.027) (0.010) (0.017)
lnMM 0.726*** 0.683*** 0.671*** 0.737***
(0.031) (0.061) (0.053) (0.047)
Sum 1.018 1.03 1.033 1.058
Observations 1122 309 1221 551
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Wald Test - Male and Female Entrepreneurs - Non EU
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
p value for left tailed test
F(num,den)
Conclusion Null Hypothesis Rejected
Male and Female returns to scale not the same
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale
for females greater than that for males
Wald Test - Male and Female Entrepreneurs - EU
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
p value for left tailed test
F(num,den)
Conclusion Null Hypothesis Rejected
Male and Female returns to scale not the same
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale
for females greater than that for males
Null Hypothesis is Rejected
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale are







Ho: αl + αk + αm < 1 βl + βk + βm <1 αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm
Men Women Men = or > Women
αl + αk + αm = 1 βl + βk + βm = 1 αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm
Men Women Men = or > Women





Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale are
greater than one  
F(1,32) F(1,26)
αl + αk + αm = 1 βl + βk + βm = 1
βl + βk + βm <1
Null Hypothesis is Rejected
0.04243564
Dependent Var.: ln(Sales)
female owned (F) 0.083
(0.066)
Avg. K in Industry -0.021**
(0.008)
F*Avg. K in Ind. -0.032**
(0.016)
Avg. L in Industry -0.043***
(0.012)




Standard errors in parentheses: *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 5: Effect of Industry Characteristics on TFP 
Note: Coefficients from estimating a Cobb-Douglas production 
Table 6a: Financing Constraints on Size (lnSales = dependent variable) - All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY
Femaleowned 0.014 -0.011 0.016 -0.008 -0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033)
Sales in 2002 0.982*** 0.982*** 0.980*** 0.983*** 0.981***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Financing from Bank 0.015**
(0.006)






Got a loan recently 0.017**
(0.007)






F*(Don’t need a loan) -0.013
(0.020)
Rate of interest -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
F*(rate of interest) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Value of collateral 0.000
(0.001)
F*(value of collateral) 0.000
(0.001)
Observations 2510 2432 2510 1259 1051
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: Robust regressions include country and industry fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Access to finance is a 
constraint to business
F*(access to finance is a 
constraint to business)
Need a loan but don’t have 
it
F*(need a loan but don’t 
have it)
Table 6b: Financing Constraints on Size (ln Sales= dependent variable) - EU vs. Non-EU countries.
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY lnYY
femaleowned -0.025 0.030*** -0.01 -0.014 0.01 0.019 0.011 0.021
(0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.037) (0.019) (0.038) (0.028)
Sales in 2002 0.980*** 0.982*** 0.980*** 0.983*** 0.979*** 0.980*** 0.984*** 0.980***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Financing from Bank 0.001 0.023***
(0.011) (0.008)






Got a loan recently 0.000 0.031***
(0.012) (0.009)






F*(Don’t need a loan) -0.038 0.002
(0.042) (0.021)
Rate of interest 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
F*(rate of interest) 0.000 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1167 1343 1132 1300 1167 1343 603 655
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Access to finance is a 
constraint to business
F*(access to finance is a 
constraint to business)
Need a loan but don’t have 
it
F*(need a loan but don’t 
have it)
Table  7: Effect of Financing Constraints on Total Factor Productivitya
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Femaleowned -0.019 -0.032** -0.038* 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.043)
Financing from Bank 0.016*
(0.009)










Got a loan recently -0.006
(0.010)
F*(got a loan recently) 0.024
(0.026)
F*(Don’t need a loan) 0.000
(0.025)
Rate of interest on loan 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
F*(rate of interest on loan) -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Value of collateral 0.000
(0.001)
F*(value of collateral) 0.000
(0.001)
Observations 3203 3096 3203 1493 1238
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
aNote: Robust regressions where ln(Sales) is the dependent variable;  
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
coefficients on ln(labor), ln(capital) and ln(materials), country and industry 
fixed effects have been supressed.  
Access to finance is a 
constraint to business
F*(access to finance is a 
constraint to business)
Need a loan but don’t have it
F*(need a loan but don’t 
have it)
Table 8: Constraints on the use of inputs (dependent variable is ln(K/L)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Femaleowned -0.021 -0.048 -0.104 -0.068 -0.012 -0.105 -0.09 0.068
(0.046) (0.047) (0.166) (0.065) (0.079) (0.122) (0.148) (0.225)
ln(sales) -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.086*** -0.082*** -0.104*** -0.093*** -0.106***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.022)
F*ln(sales) 0.01
(0.028)
Financing from Bank 0.125***
(0.047)










Got a loan recently 0.206***
(0.053)
F*(got a loan recently) 0.105
(0.140)
F*(Don’t need a loan) -0.013
(0.136)
Rate of interest on loan -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
F*(rate of interest on loan) 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.011)
Value of collateral 0.001
(0.001)
F*(value of collateral) -0.001
(0.001)
Observations 3506 3332 3332 3332 3219 3332 1550 1289
R-squared 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.44
Note: Robust regressions include country and industry fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Access to finance is a 
constraint to business
F*(access to finance is a 
constraint to business)
Need a loan but don’t have 
it
F*(need a loan but don’t 
have it)
Table 9: Within and Between Industry Variance for Entrepreneurs
Analysis of Variance for Ln(sales) - Male Entrepreneurs
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Between groups 533.00 32.00 16.66 7.13 0.000
Within groups 5634.99 2411.00 2.34
Total 6167.99 2443.00 2.52
Bartlett's test for equal variance chi2 (89) 53.643
Prob>chi2 0.010
Analysis of Variance for Ln(sales) - Female Entrepreneurs
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Between groups 596.28 30.00 19.88 10.03 0.000
Within groups 1698.56 857.00 1.98
Total 2294.84 887.00 2.59
Bartlett's test for equal variance chi2(81) 39.104
Prob>chi2 0.036
Figure 1: Share of Female Entrepreneurs by Country
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Fig 4:  Plots of the Share of Female Entrepreneurs in an Industry v. Industry Characterisitics
Sales Revenue Output per worker
Capital per Worker TFP
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Fig 5: Kernel Density Estimates of TFP for Male and Female Entrepreneurs
Note: Kernel density calculated using Epanechnikov kernel function.























Ln Sales    
Female
lnL 0.388*** 0.420*** 0.200*** 0.209***
(0.072) (0.110) (0.011) (0.013)
lnK 0.039*** 0.015 0.027*** 0.016*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
lnM 0.617*** 0.649*** 0.785*** 0.802***
(0.067) (0.075) (0.012) (0.010)
Sum 1.044 1.084 1.012 1.027
Observations 997 479 1346 381
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99
Standard errors clustered by industry and shown in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Reg with country and industry fixed effects
Wald Test - Mfg and Services Male Entrepreneurs
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
Ho:




Mfg and Services returns to scale 
not the same
Cannot reject the hypothesis that 
returns to scale for services 
greater than that for 
manufacturing
αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm






Null Hypothesis is Rejected
αl + αk + αm = 1 βl + βk + βm = 1
0.001700 0.002500
αl + αk + αm < 1 βl + βk + βm <1
0.000827 0.001231
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale are 
greater than one  
Wald Test - Mfg and Services Female Entrepreneurs
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
Ho:
p value for left tailed test
F(num,den)
Conclusion Null Hypothesis Rejected
Wald Test -  Male and Female Entrepreneurs (Mfg and Services)
Ho:
p value for 2 tailed test
Ho:
p value for left tailed test
F(num,den)
Conclusion
Cannot reject the hypothesis that 
returns to scale for females is 
greater than that for males
Cannot reject the hypothesis 
(at 10% level) that returns to 
scale for females greater than 
that for males
Services
Male = or > Female
αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
0.173700
αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm
0.086873
F(1,12)
Null Hypothesis RejectedNull Hypothesis Rejected
Male and female returns to 
scale not the same
Male and female returns to scale 
not the same
Mfg and Services returns to scale 
not the same
Cannot reject the hypothesis that 
returns to scale for services 




αl + αk + αm > βl + βk + βm
Mfg = or > Services
αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
0.073000




αl + αk + αm = 1 βl + βk + βm = 1
0.035400 0.006900
αl + αk + αm < 1 βl + βk + βm <1
0.017720 0.003471
F(1,11) F(1,18)
αl + αk + αm = βl + βk + βm
0.198600
Null Hypothesis is Rejected
Cannot reject the hypothesis that returns to scale are 
greater than one  
Mfg
Male = or > Female
ln(sales) Male 2444 6.01 1.59 2.08 11.32
Female 888 5.46 1.61 2.20 11.32 Y at 0.01 level
ln(labor) Male 2568 2.89 1.32 1.10 7.38
Female 938 2.44 1.25 1.10 7.20 Y at 0.01 level
ln(capital) Male 2568 4.92 1.68 0.69 10.82
Female 938 4.44 1.70 0.69 10.35 Y at 0.01 level
ln(materials) Male 2350 5.09 1.74 0.69 10.60
Female 861 4.51 1.80 0.69 10.99 Y at 0.01 level
profits Male 2411 227.30 686.56 -669.00 10540
Female 876 166.14 670.78 -75.00 10604 Y at 0.05 level
profits/sales Male 2411 0.14 0.09 -0.56 0.60
Female 876 0.15 0.10 -0.29 0.94 Y at 0.05 level
ln(capital per worker)  Male 2568 2.12 1.43 -3.18 7.33
Female 938 2.12 1.40 -2.81 6.86 N
financing from bank Male 2568 0.53 0.50 0 1
(local or foreign or state owned) Female 938 0.51 0.50 0 1 N
financing from internal sources Male 2019 73.89 36.60 0 100
(internal+family/friends+money lenders & other informal) Female 674 78.16 35.01 0 100 Y at 0.01 level
financing from external sources Male 2019 23.13 34.87 0 100
(Banks+Credit cards+Leasing) Female 674 17.23 31.82 0 100 N
got a loan recently Male 2568 0.43 0.50 0 1
(within last 12 months) Female 938 0.37 0.48 0 1 Y at 0.01 level
do not need a loan Male 2568 0.26 0.44 0 1
Female 938 0.27 0.44 0 1 N
need a loan but do not have it Male 2568 0.19 0.40 0 1
Female 938 0.25 0.43 0 1 Y at 0.01 level
access to finance is a constraint to business Male 2489 0.67 0.47 0 1
Female 893 0.66 0.47 0 1 N
rate of interest on loan Male 1228 13.47 6.85 0.70 70
Female 394 13.39 6.67 0.50 36 N
value of collateral for loan Male 1062 163.20 75.74 12.00 600
Female 336 173.15 76.21 30.00 500 Y at 0.05 level
capacity utilitzation (%) Male 2546 81.13 19.54 5 100
Female 923 82.36 19.35 10 100 Y at 0.1 level
age of firm Male 2566 2.36 0.61 1.39 5.19
Female 936 2.31 0.60 1.39 4.96 Y at 0.05 level
Table A2: Means and St. Dev. of Variables by Gender (for analytical sample)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
M-F (Significance of 
Difference)
Table A3: Sources of Finance by Gender
Male
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Internal funds/ Retained earnings 2553 67.8 37.6 2039 64.3 40.5
Equity (i.e. issue of new share) 2553 5.2 18.7 2039 4.9 19.4
Borrowing from local private commercial 2553 9.6 21.5 2039 13.2 27.9
Borrowing from foreign banks 2553 1.0 6.8 2039 1.7 10.7
Borrowing from state owned banks 2553 2.0 10.2 2039 2.2 12.1
Loans from family/friends 2553 4.1 14.5 2039 3.6 14.2
Money lenders and other informal sourc 2553 1.2 7.4 2039 1.2 8.1
Trade credit from suppliers 2553 4.2 14.1 2039 1.0 6.9
Trade credit from customers 2553 1.0 6.6 2039 0.4 4.2
Credit Cards 2553 0.6 5.4 2039 0.4 4.5
Leasing arrangement 2553 1.9 8.9 2039 5.5 18.8
The government 2553 0.4 4.9 2039 0.2 2.7
Other 2553 1.0 9.0 2039 1.4 11.0
Female
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Internal funds/ Retained earnings 925 71.7 38.2 679 68.5 40.2
Equity (i.e. issue of new share) 925 5.3 19.9 679 4.9 19.4
Borrowing from local private commercial 925 6.4 18.4 679 9.3 24.5
Borrowing from foreign banks 925 1.0 8.0 679 1.4 10.2
Borrowing from state owned banks 925 1.5 9.0 679 2.0 11.5
Loans from family/friends 925 3.4 13.3 679 4.1 16.0
Money lenders and other informal sourc 925 0.4 3.8 679 0.6 4.5
Trade credit from suppliers 925 5.2 16.2 679 1.6 8.4
Trade credit from customers 925 1.2 8.1 679 0.7 6.1
Credit Cards 925 0.5 4.5 679 0.2 4.0
Leasing arrangement 925 1.5 6.8 679 4.3 16.9
The government 925 0.4 4.9 679 0.4 4.1
Other 925 1.4 11.2 679 1.9 13.2
Working Capital New Investment
Working Capital New Investment
Data for Secondary Education from World Development Indicators 2006
Data for Female Entrepreneurship from BEEPS 2005
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